RE: [Cz-L] Rescue Operation of Czernowitz Jews - A Joint Venture

Dear Mimi, Dear Hardy et al.
 
Thank you so much for your contribution! Our group proves once more to be  - in the proper meaning of the word - a discussion group, but before carrying forward the discussion, I'd like to make two preliminary notes:
 
- The academic article in German language runs to 14 pages, including many references and 57 footnotes. As soon as it will be translated to English language by February/March next year, we'll all get the opportunity to debate on it.
 
- All parties, i. e. the author, the editor and the quoted historians, are beyond any suspicion of minimizing or reinterpreting the Holocaust whatsoever, quite the contrary, they contributed by their publications to provide evidence on the Romanian Holocaust.
 
And now, let's go back to our discussion and let me quote another paragraph from Dr. Vladimir Solonari's (USHMM) article "THE TREATMENT OF THE JEWS OF BUKOVINA BY THE SOVIET AND ROMANIAN ADMINISTRATIONS IN 1940-1944" [HOLOCAUST AND MODERNITY, No. 2 (8) 2010, p. 170]:
 
"Throughout the summer and fall of 1941, as most Jews of Bessarabia and Bukovina were detained in the concentration camps, the city of Cernăuţi remained the only place in those provinces where survivors of the first wave of murder lived in relative security. Until October 12, no ghetto had yet been established there and Jews were free to move about the city- an exception made possible by the courageous resistance of the municipal administration headed by Mayor Traian Popovici, who sabotaged antisemit- ic orders from above. However, following Antonescu's October 10 decree to immediately create a ghetto and to begin deportations of all Jews from the city on October 14, Governor Calotescu was finally able to crush the resist- ance of Popovici and his group. The ghetto was erected and preparations for deportations ensued. Still, on October 15 Antonescu issued an order to allow 15,000 'economically useful' Jews to remain in the city of Cernauti. This surprise reversal of the initial order
 is usually attributed to Traian Popovici's influence, but it seems that the real answer to this mystery lies elsewhere. Without .[see previous posting]"
 
Let's try now to take a step forward to reveal this mystery:
 
Traian Popovici was - as admitted by himself - unknown to Ion Antonescu. He was already the third mayor since July 1941 (!) and "his days were numbered", as stated by Theodor Ellgering, German Legation Councilor in Bucharest. Anyway, reporting to Governor Corneliu Calotescu, he couldn't address himself directly to Ion Antonescu. On the other hand, Schellhorn and Ion Antonescu knew each other privately since 1939, even before Antonescu's seizure of power. Both, they were admirers of the French culture and had common interests. Schellhorn's intervention in favor of Romanian refugees in Summer 1940 brought Schellhorn the second highest Romanian decoration, much more than appropriate for a Consul or even a General Consul. Previously, 14,000 more Germans have been evacuated from Northern Bukovina than the total number of registered Germans in that area amounted, i. e. about 14,000 Romanians were "germanized" by issuing German identity documents to them and they fled from the Soviets.
 
Let's examine now the events on the decisive day of 15.10.1941:
 
Remember "Antonescu's October 10 decree to immediately create a ghetto and to begin deportations of all Jews from the city". On 15.10.1941 at least two meetings were taking place on this subject.
 
As a matter of fact, Schellhorn - as a typical accurate German official and diplomat - reported verifiable and in detail to his Foreign Ministry in Berlin on his morning session with Governor Calotescu and on his intervention in favor of "strategically indispensable" Czernowitz Jews immediately, i. e. BEFORE he came to know the results of his venture. Dr. Nicolae Lupu, a prominent Romanian politician from the Peasants' Party attended the meeting as translator.
 
During the afternoon session, Governor Calotescu declared that - after consultation with himself - Ion Antonescu has revised his initial order, dated 10.10.1941, with respect to 20,000 (!?) 'economically useful' Jews from Czernowitz, to be spared from deportations. Schellhorn, Traian Popovici, General Ionescu and others attended this afternoon session and they were all required by Calotescu to elaborate the exemptions lists.
 
Let me summerize as follows:
 
1. Although Dr. Hartwig Cremers is characterizing Schellhorn as a humanist, I don't want to speculate on his motivation, but it seems to me concludent and proven, that the progress of events on 15.10.1941 happened as described above, but: Who knows, whether this attempt was not the result of a joint venture between Schellhorn and Popovici, Schellhorn making the fronting, keeping in mind Schellhorn's authority as a German diplomat and Popovici's critical relationship to Calotescu?
 
2. It seems to be historically verified as well, that Popovici suppressed Schellhorn's role, but: Could Popovici in post-war-Soviet-ruled Romania - at the risk of his own life - acknowledge that he maintained amicable relations to a high-ranking German diplomat, moreover imprisoned in Russia? Unfortunately Popovici deceased eraly, i. e. in June 1946, but Schellhorn returned 1955 from Russian captivity.
 
In any case, all the questions raised by you, Mimi, and by you, Hardy, are most interesting and I'm going to pass them on to Dr. Hartwig Cremers. Thank you once again for your contribution, wishing you amazing holidays!

Edgar Hauster
Lent - The Netherlands
 
http://hauster.blogspot.com/
                                               
Received on 2011-12-23 09:03:56